Proving Fifteenth Century Promises by Teeven, Kevin
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 24, Number 1 (Spring 1986) Article 4
Proving Fifteenth Century Promises
Kevin Teeven
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Article
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Teeven, Kevin. "Proving Fifteenth Century Promises." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 24.1 (1986) : 121-139.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol24/iss1/4
Proving Fifteenth Century Promises
Abstract
During the fifteenth century, common law courts began to allow plaintiffs to bring actions for breach of
informal promises under the trespassory action of assumpsit. The royal courts built evidentiary safeguards
into this new use of assumpsit. This article analyzes how the courts' concern for proof of informal promises
had an impact on the shape that the law of contract took on.




During the fifteenth century, common law courts began to allow plaintiffs to bring
actions for breach of informal promises under the trespassory action of assumpsit.
The royal courts built evidentiary safeguards into this new use of assumpsit. This
article analyzes how the courts' concern for proof of informal promises had an
impact on the shape that the law of contract took on.
Twentieth century common law lawyers know that a plaintiff has
a remedy for the breach of a promise to do something in the future.
Such a promise was not actionable until the early Renaissance period
in England. The common law courts of the Middle Ages resisted adopting
this modem theory because of the archaic truth-seeking devices then
available. The fifteenth century was a pivotal period in the development
of a modem theory of contract.
Contract law in the year 1400 was clinging to unworkable archaic
remedies. A common law judge sitting in the year 1400 was comfortable
with permitting an action for breach of a well-documented promise to
be submitted to a mode of proof then available; but breaches of informal
promises were barred from going to trial as those modes of proof were
distrusted by the judiciary. The depreciation in the value of money and
the manner in which business was transacted necessitated the fashioning
of exceptions to the traditionally strict documentary requirements of proof
of transactions in order to accommodate the changing commercial world
outside Westminster Hall. These departures from earlier contract law
were made incrementally throughout the fifteenth century with evidentiary
safeguards built into each change so that by the end of the century the
groundwork for modem contract theory had been laid. This article
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analyzes howjudicial demands for adequate proof of an alleged agreement
left its imprint on the form that contract law took as the century
progressed.'
I. THE STATE OF THE LAW OF PROOF
The ancient modes of trial invoking the supernatural as a truth-
seeking device had for the most part disappeared by the fifteenth century.
Trial by battle and the ordeals of boiling water and the heated iron
were largely shadowy memories of an earlier dark age.2 However, one
ancient procedure known as wager of law was still widely used during
the fifteenth century.3
The records4 indicate that wager of law was the primary mode of
proof in informal debt actions.5 In wager the defendant presented eleven
oath helpers, or compugators, who swore to the defendant's reputation
for credibility rather than to the facts of the transaction before the court.6
Wager was effective for unwitnessed, informal transactions heard in the
local courts where the common men of the country were aware of the
defendant's reputation and often of the alleged transaction.7 Wager was
I Legal historians have studied other determinants of the shape that contract law has taken.
Examples include: the influence of the doctrine of consideration in O.W. Holmes, The Common
Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1881); the influence of economics in M. Horwitz, The Transformation
of American Law 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); and the study of the
influence of procedure in F.W. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1936).
2 Trial by battle was not officially ended until 1819 by the Statutes at Large, 59 Geo. III,
c. 46, though for all practical purposes it was not used much after the Medieval period.
3 T.F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, 5th ed. (London: Butterworth, 1956)
at 113-19.
4 A variety of source material generated during this period is available to the legal historian.
Two important sources are: (1) the plea rolls of the King's Bench and the Court of Common
Pleas, which were records kept by these two royal courts regarding the disputes brought before
them sitting in Westminster Hall; and (2) the Year Books, which were in effect the reports of
the judicial opinions stated orally during these proceedings and written down by law students from
the Inns of Court. The originals of the plea rolls are found today in the Public Record Office
in London. Some of the Year Books have been translated by the Selden Society.
5 S.F.C. Milsom, "Sale of Goods in the Fifteenth Century" (1961) 77 L.Q. Rev. 257 at 260.
6 J.B. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1898) at 27; Maitland,
supra, note I at 13; A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1975) at 137-38.
7 During the Age of Faith of the Middle Ages, the defendant and the compugators were
viewed as having imperiled their souls if they perjured themselves. See Simpson, supra, note 6
at 138-40. Even before the waning of the Age of Faith, there were attempts to bar the use of
wager of law when the facts were well known to the "folk in the country": Anon (1303) 19 Selden
Soc. 195-96.
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least effective in cases heard by the common law courts8 at Westminster
Hall where defendants would hire anonymous oath helpers known as
"knights of the post."9 As wager favoured defendants, promises were
going unenforced. Disenchanted plaintiffs, both men of business and
commoners, altered the development of contract theory in their efforts
to prevent a defendant from being given the opportunity to wage his
law.
Since trial by jury favoured plaintiffs, the plaintiff had to elect an
action where only that mode of proof was permitted. The action which
plaintiffs utilized to achieve that objective was the tort of trespass. In
the view of the royal courts, trial by jury was deficient because jurors
were guilty of countless instances of perjury'O and the courts lacked
adequate control over the juries of the Middle Ages. The principal cause
of this lack of control was twofold: first, jurors had the right to consider
evidence discovered outside the walls of the courtroom; and second, the
rules of evidence were, by modem standards, primitive. The jurors' right
to consider evidence they observed firsthand originated in the preceding
centuries when jurors were essentially witnesses to the event in con-
troversy." Much of the evidence a jury could consider would be
inadmissable today under the modem rules of evidence, especially hearsay.
The modem notion of a jury is the reverse of its progenitor; the modem
juror is selected for lack of knowledge about the transaction, whereas
8 The two royal courts which formed the modem theory of common law contract were the
King's Bench and the Court of Common Pleas. During the period of this study, the non-royal
local courts, a continuation of an Anglo-Saxon tradition, carried a heavy caseload of contract cases
and had an influence on the contract theory ultimately developed, since the royal courts borrowed
workable devices employed by the local courts.
9 J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 2d ed. (London: Butterworths, 1979)
at 88. There was not even a procedure for punishing the defendant for perjury. Hence an unscrupulous
defendant had an easy route avoiding liability. Such instances increased as the Age of Faith waned
during the fifteenth century. See W.T. Barbour, The History of Contract in Early English Equity
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914) at 55, 99 for a discussion of when Chancery would grant relief
in harsh cases to plaintiffs who lost to defendants who waged their law in common law actions.
Res judicata did not appear to present a problem for Chancery's court of conscience. See also
St. Germain's Doctor and Student (1530) 91 Selden Soc. 232: the student said, "And in lyke wyse
yf a man wage his law vntrulye in an accyon of dette vpon a contracte in the kynges courte/
yet he shall not be suyd for that periury in the spyrituall courte/and yet noo remedye lyeth for
that periurye in the kynges courte. ... "
1O Several Medieval statutes refer to "the perjury which horribly continues and daily increases
in the common jurors of the kingdom." Statute of Westminster, 5 Edw. III, c. 10; Statute of Westminster,
34 Edw. III, c. 8 and Statute of Westminster, 38 Edw. III, c. 12.
11 J. Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Anglie, trans. T. Smith (New York: Garland, 1979) ch.
s 27, 21, where Fortescue writes about jurors in the fifteenth century: "These know all that the
witnesses admit in their dispositions.... [Niothing, provided it be within human ken, can be concealed
or unknown to such jurors." See also M. Hale, The History of the Common Law, 4th ed. by C.
Runnington (London: Strahan & Woodfall, 1779) at 292-93, where even into the seventeenth century,
Hale could say "for the trial is NOT simply BY WITNESSES, but by jury; nay, it may fall out,
that the jury upon their Own Knowledge may Know a thing to be false .. "
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the essential character of an ancient juror was intimate knowledge of
the facts in question.
Furthermore, the evidence introduced in a trial by jury proceeding
was not subject to an effective set of exclusionary rules in any way
resembling the modem law of evidence. Witnesses rarely testified in court
prior to the fifteenth century, 2 and the testimony of the parties themselves
was inadmissable.13 Medieval judges preferred the evidence of interested
witnesses to disinterested witnesses; again, it was the reverse of the modern
approach which views interested testimony with suspicion.' 4
Control over the jury was also restricted by the judicial custom
of requiring that a general verdict be given in trespass.' 5 This problem
was created by the judiciary's reluctance to bear sole responsibility for
the trial verdict.' 6 There was not the analysis of facts that there would
have been in a special verdict.'7 The jury was given a freer rein in decision-
making, thus further exacerbating the problem of the favourable treatment
of plaintiffs in trespass actions on informal agreements. Without a step-
by-step analysis of the facts through a series of special verdicts, as at
an assize, the court had no way of knowing upon what the jury based
its verdict.' 8 This may help explain why the courts tenaciously maintained
the requirement of a sealed covenant, as will be examined below.
12 J.H. Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common
Law, vol. 2, rev'd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979) para. 575. Babington v. Venor (1465), Long
Quint (5 Edw. IV) 58. J. Fortescue, ibid., recognized the use of witnesses at the trial. See also
Anon (1433), Y.B. It Hen. VI f. 43, pl. 3 6 . Before the mid-fifteenth century, witnesses infrequently
testified before the jury - unlike the assize where evidence could be submitted to the jury as
early as the thirteenth century: Bracton's Note Book, (1233) No. 825. The local assize had advanced
methods of proof because of the ease of having all issues resolved at one time where witnesses
were readily available to testify. See D.W. Sutherland, TheAssize Of NovelDisselsin (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1973).
13 This remained the case in the sixteenth century and later. See Dymoke's Case (1582), Savile
34 pl. 81.
14 In Anon (1613), 1 Bulstrode 202, as late as this date interested witnesses were still allowed
to testify. A witness committed the tort of maintenance if he testified to a jury without an interest
in the outcome of the case. See Anon, supra, note 12; Pomeroy v. Abbot of Bukfast (1442), Y.B.
21 Hen. VI f. 15, pl. 30. See Thayer, supra, note 6 at 127.
15 Anon (1407), Y.B. 7 Hen. VI f. 11, pl. 3.
16 S.F.C. Milsom, "Law and Fact in Legal Development" (1967) 17 U. Toronto LJ. 1 at
10-16.
17 A general verdict is a finding by the jury either for the plaintiff or for the defendant.
In a special verdict the jury finds the facts at issue, and the court then applies the law to those
facts. As early as 1285 jurors were given the statutory right to state the facts and leave it to
the court to determine if there had been a disseisin. Statute of Westminster, 13 Edw. I, c. 30.
18 M.A. Arnold, "Law and Fact in the Medieval Jury: Out of Sight, Out of Mind" (1974)
18 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 267. The Statute of Westminster 11, 38 Edw. III, c. 30 had encouraged special
verdicts at the assize, but the statute had not been construed to apply to trespass. On the procedures
in an assize, again see Sutherland, supra, note I 1 at 73.
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Due to the shortcomings of wager of law and trial by jury, the
common law courts demanded strict proof of the existence of an agreement
before it could be submitted to a mode of proof. 9 These evidentiary
demands led to the lack of enforcement of many parol promises. There
had to be an allegation of something more than a mere promise in order
to avoid a demurrer. Plaintiffs would allege a writing or a quid pro
quo or even a tortious wrong in order to convince the court that there
was adequate evidence of the agreement to allow it to a mode of proof.
II. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
The most effective method for the plaintiff to comply with the
common law courts' demand for strict proof of an agreement was to
produce formal written evidence of the defendant's promise - for
example, a covenant, conditioned bond, recognizance, or account. Men
of wealth and of business experience were well acquainted with the success
of these devices in the courts and documented their agreements accord-
ingly. In the common law courts at the beginning of the fifteenth century,
plaintiffs who failed to properly document transactions went away empty
handed. It is curious that during an Age of Faith there was such a gap
in the royal courts between contract law and the moral principle of keeping
one's promises.20
The writ of covenant, one of the oldest actions in the King's courts,
was older still in the local courts.21 The old writs bear the closest
resemblance to modem contract. Covenant remedied the breach of an
executory promise to do something in the future;22 but the action would
not succeed unless the plaintiff could provide the jury with a contractual
19 One is not on secure ground in attempting to draw direct parallels between Medieval and
modem court procedures. Nonetheless, it may be easier for the modem lawyer to envision the
parallel of the Medieval courts' demand for proof of an informal promise as a motion for dismissal
of a suit for lack of a cause of action or for summary judgment.
20 M.S. Arnold, "Fourteenth Century Promises" (1976) 35 Camb. LJ. 321. The explanation
was partially because the local courts and the ecclesiastical courts were granting relief in many
of these cases. R.H. Helmholz, "Assumpsit and Fidei Laesio" (1975) 91 L.Q. Rev. 406.
21 S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of The Common Law, 2d. ed. (Toronto: Butterworths,
1981) at 246.
22 Ibid at 246-47. One must be cautious not to read "contract" in the year books to mean
what the modem lawyer understands by that term. The Year Books used "contract" to mean the
narrow focus of an informal agreement giving rise to an action of debt for a sum certain. There
was no recognition of a comprehensive action for breach of an informal agreement. Such agreements
were only partially actionable through procedural forms within which they had to work. Furthermore,
there was no consideration requirement until the sixteenth century and no doctrine of offer and
acceptance until the nineteenth century. The Medieval lawyer was thinking about a consensual
transaction which transferred property or generated a debt. See Simpson, supra; note 6 at 5-6,
185-87.
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document sealed2 3 by the defendant.24 As Finchden Ci. said, ". .. the
action is taken on the deed and without a deed it cannot be maintained." 25
The sealed deed seemed an ideal solution to the royal courts' demand
for persuasive evidence of a contractual relationship. In Medieval England
the question was not one of substantive law but rather one of what kind
of proof the plaintiff must tender. The common law courts viewed the
sealed covenant as evidence of the contract and receipt of the instrument
was proof. The document witnessed the covenant just as witnesses served
to prove other types of agreements. 26
Although covenant seemed an ideal remedy, in time it was marred
by the courts' unyielding demand for a sealed covenant.27 The inflexibility
of this archaic ritual was not covenant's only shortcoming. The rigorous
process of capias, which authorized the arrest of an incompliant defendant,
was not available in covenant.2 8 The writ used to resolve these two
objections was debt sur obligation (on an obligation). Debt sur obligation
was a well-accepted common law remedy by the beginning of the fifteenth
century.2 9
The plaintiff's burden of proof in debt sur obligation was less extensive
than in covenant 30 and it qualified for capias.31 Due to the procedural
advantages of debt sur obligation over covenant, the greatest number
of cases appearing in plea rolls were of this kind.32 In order to sustain
the burden of proof, a plaintiff using this form of action produced a
sealed document referred to as a conditioned bond.33 In the bond the
23 The seal was roughly equivalent to a signature in an illiterate age.
24 See Milsom, supra, note 21 at 248. In the twelfth century the royal courts followed the
local courts' lead and entertained actions for the breach of informal covenants. Since most cases
in the fourteenth century were decided in Westminster, often a great distance from the local witnesses
and compugators who knew of the defendant and possibly of the transaction, the royal courts
began to require a sealed deed before the writ of covenant could be used. See Baker, supra, note
9 at 265; See Sutherland, supra; note 12 at 198. In the Case of the Waltham Carrier (1321) 86
Selden Soc. 286 at 287, Herle J. said, "The law will not be changed for a cartload of hay; for
a covenant is neither more nor less than an agreement between parties which cannot be taken
to law without specialty."
25 The Prior of Bradstock's Case (1371), Y.B. 44 Edw. III f. 42, pl. 46.
26 Thayer, supra, note 6 at 13.
27 Simpson, supra, note 6 at 43-47.
28 The Statute of Purveyors, 25 Edw. III, c. 17. Capias, originally available in pleas of the
Crown as trespass and criminal law, was in the form of a writ for arrest of a defendant who
failed to appear (capias ad respondendum). There was also a procedure for an arrest of a defendant
who failed to satisfy a judgment (capias ad satisfaciendum).
29 Arnold, supra, note 20.
30 S.F.C. Milsom, "Reason in the Development of the Common Law" (1965) 81 L.Q. Rev.
496 at 509-10.
31 Supra, note 28.
32 A.K. Kiralfy, The Action on the Case (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1951) at 189.
33 Simpson, supra, note 6 at 90.
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defendant confessed to be bound to the plaintiff in a liquidated amount
of twice the underlying contract obligation, thus alleviating the problems
of proving up damages in covenant.34 Production of the bond by the
plaintiff to the jury was viewed as dispositive.35 The courts did not allow
wager of law since it was irrational to hear testimony regarding the
defendant's reputation for veracity in the face of his bond.3 6
While discussing the use of debt actions by men of commerce it
is appropriate to mention recognizance - a popular device for doc-
umenting a consensual relationship. 37 This was perhaps the most foolproof
way for creditors to prove their claims. Debtors voluntarily appeared
before the court to acknowledge their obligations to pay money at the
onset of the agreement. The court's enrollment of this acknowledgment
was treated as a debt judgment. In the event of a default there was
no trial; liability was established and execution ordered by producing
the court records.3 8 These procedures began in the law merchant courts
sitting at the annual fairs and were later adopted by the common law
courts and formalized by Parliament.39
Plaintiffs also relied on the records of the court in the writ of account.
This writ was issued against third parties who held property of the plaintiff
and were called on to account for it. The writ required an audit of third
parties (such as in the management of property by a manorial bailiff)
or an audit of the affairs of other types of fiduciaries (such as agents,
trustees, and later, partners).40 The accounting would be completed by
two court-appointed auditors, acting in a special fact-finding role, which
is reminiscent in function to a master-in-chancery. If a balance was found
due the plaintiff, a debt action was established in which wager was
excluded.41
In a debt action on the accounting and a debt action on a recognizance
the proof of debt was a matter of court record42 - in account by the
34 Ibid. at 90-95.
35 See Milsom, supra, note 21 at 250. The only defence generally permitted was that the
bond was invalid. A parol defence was not permitted. Anon (1485), Y.B. 1 Hen. VII f. 14, pl. 2.
36 Facts that were well known to the men of the countryside could not be rebutted by wager.
"All that which lies within the notice of the country shall be tried by the country." Anon (1454-
55), Y.B. 33 Hen. VI f. 7, pl. 23.
37 Simpson, supra, note 6 at 126.
38 The enforceability of a confession of judgment clause bears a resemblance to these shortcut
procedures available to creditors in the fifteenth century.
39 Statute of Merchants 13 Edw. I and Statium de Stapulig 27 Edw. III, c. 9.
40 Baker, supra note 9 at 301. J.H. Baker, "The Law Merchant and the Common Law Before
1700" (1979) Camb. L.J. 295 at 301.
41 Milsom, supra, note 5 at 260-61.
42 Wager was not permitted in these types of debt actions since the only method of trial
allowed was comparison of documentation. See Simpson, supra note 6 at 126-28.
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court's adoption of the auditors' report43 and in recognizance by the court's
enrollment of the debt earlier recognized by the debtor.44 It would have
been illogical to allow the defendant to deny the debt via wager in the
face of the court records.
The mode of trial for a debt action on the account was trial by
jury, whereas the trial for debt on a recognizance was by a comparison
of the plaintiffs documents and the court's enrollment. This difference
existed because the auditors could have been negligent or guilty of a
connivance; but, the defendant's admission of the debt in open court
needed no such scrutiny. Account's use of trial by jury in a debt action45
was one of two instances where trial by jury replaced wager. In the
other, a debt action for rent on a lease of land, the physical presence
of the defendant on the plaintiffs land was too notorious a fact to the
community to permit its denial through wager of law. 46
Other attempts of the parties to provide proof of debt transactions
bear mentioning only in passing because of their lack of long term success
in the royal courts. First was the mercantile tally. The tally was a piece
of wood recording the debt with notches. The creditor retained the stock
and the debtor the foil.47 The tally fell into disuse since because it was
unsealed, wager was allowed.48 Second was the use of merchants' records,
but this proof was also diluted by wager of law. 49 Finally, a party to
the transaction could produce witnesses to testify. Although this testimony
was permitted by the local courts, the royal courts did not accept this
type of evidence in the case of unsealed covenants, and wager was again
allowed.50
43 Milsom, supra, note 5 at 260-61.
44 Simpson, supra, note 6 at 126-28.
45 Account was not devoid of written evidence of the obligation since the accounting before
the auditors was a matter of record.
46 Anon (1495), Y.B. 10 Hen. VII f. 4, pl. 4.
47 Beneyt v. Lodewyk (1310) 20 Selden Soc. 46 and Finchingfeld v. Bycho (1311) 26 Selden
Soc. 153.
48 Plucknett, supra, note 3 at 633n.
49 With respect to merchants' records, wager became a statutory right for the citizens of
London in 1364. See Statute of Westminster, 38 Edw. III, c. 5.
50 Milsom, supra, note 21 at 254. Baker, supra, note 9 at 265. See Anon (1248) 90 Selden
Soc. 119, where transaction witnesses had earlier been sufficient in royal courts to prove an informal
covenant. In London, if there were witnesses to a statement of the balance due, wager was precluded.
This was not followed by the royal courts. S.F.C. Milsom, "Account Stated in the Action of Debt"
(1966) 82 L.Q. Rev. 534. In the assize, witnesses to a deed would be called into court to testify
before the jury. See Sutherland, supra, note 12 at 71.
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II. DEFENDANT'S RECEIPT OF MONEY OR GOODS
When the plaintiff lacked documentary evidence to prove the
defendant's obligation, the plaintiff had to point to some other tangible
evidence of the agreement in order to avoid a demurrer. Throughout
most of the fifteenth century, the royal courts were too distrustful of
the primitive modes of proof then available to enforce an alleged informal
agreement without something more than an oral covenant.5'
The courts viewed a partially performed transaction, such as a loan,
a sale, or a bailment, as something more than mere words. The loan
or sale was an act done and provable, 52 and liability was based on a
transaction rather than on a formal documentary acknowledgment.53 The
writs used to establish liability for these informal agreements were the
related writs of debt sur contract (on a contract) and detinue. Under
the writ of debt, defendants could generally wage their law.
The writ of debt sur contract was a money obligation such as a
loan or a purchase of fungible goods. Detinue indicated a property interest
held by the plaintiff and was brought by a buyer of ascertainable goods
or by a bailor for unreturned property. The defendant was held liable
under these two writs not because he orally covenanted but because
he had received money or property to which the plaintiff had a proprietary
interest.54
In the action of debt sur contrat the evidence of the informal
agreement was the proof of the defendant's receipt of a sum or certain
benefit from the plaintiff. This benefit, known as the quid pro quo, 55
evidenced the existence of an agreement. The defendant was not obligated
because he or she had agreed to buy the plaintiffs horse but because
he or she had received the horse.56 If the defendant merely agreed to
buy the horse, the plaintiff could not use debt sur contrat because this
action was not available for executory agreements.57 The only fifteenth
51 See St Germain's Doctor and Student, supra, note 9 at 228-9. The student emphasized
that an executory informal contract was enforceable if it was executed on one side.
52 Baker, supra, note 9 at 267-68.
53 Milsom, supra, note 21 at 260.
54 Ibid.
55 J.B. Ames, "The History of Parol Contracts Prior to Assumpsit" in E. Freund et aL, eds.,
Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, vol. 3 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1901) 304 at 316-
17.
56 See Simpson, supra, note 6 at 153-54. Debt was the granting of something to the plaintiff/
creditor. This could be claimed by the plaintiff because the transaction entitled him or her to it.
The action was based on a traditional proprietary right rather than the modem enforcement of
a promise. Despite debt sur contrat's shortcomings, it was the most commonly used Medieval remedy
for the breach of informal obligations.
57 See Ames, supra, note 55 at 306. In Anon (1488), Y.B. 18 Edw. IV f. 5, pl. 30, Vavasour
J. said, "It will be contrary to reason to compel him to pay money ... where he has had nothing .. "
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century remedy for an executory promise was to produce a sealed covenant
or a conditioned bond.
There were obvious limitations to the plaintiff of the value of debt
sur contrat. One already mentioned was its unavailability for executory
promises. A second was that guaranty contracts58 were unenforceable.
In a 1431 guaranty case it was stated that there was no liability in the
guarantor because he had received nothing.59 Since no benefit flowed
to the defendant, the court was unwilling to find that an agreement existed.
Another limitation of debt sur contrat was that despite the fact that the
defendant was in possession of a benefit received from the plaintiff, the
defendant could successfully deny the allegation and wage his law. In
time some courts began to question the unrestricted traditional right of
wager in certain cases. 60 One example of the irrationality of wager was
in an action brought by a plaintiff against a deceased debtor's estate.
An executor was not liable for the debts of the decedent because only
the decedent could use wager.6' This conclusion was consistent with the
notion that only the decedent had the knowledge of any alleged private
transaction for which he or she was obligated; but, if there had been
a sealed covenant the executor would have been held liable.62
Wager was also permitted in detinue.63 The allowance of wager
seemed an irrational proof to use in cases such as detinue on a bailment
where the local community was aware of the defendant's possession of
the plaintiff's property. However, by the fifteenth century wager became
important to protect the defendant against baseless allegations prompted
58 The guarantor promises a debtor's creditor to satisfy the debt in the event of the debtor's
default. A guaranty contract is made between the guarantor and the creditor and is separate from
the contract between the creditor and the debtor.
59 Brooke, in abridging the 1431 guaranty contract case, pointed out that there was no liability
in the guarantor because he had received nothing: "Words or a promise to pay 10 pounds without
quidpro quo do not make a contract, for it is only a nudumpactuir." R. Brooke, Grand Abridgement,
Contract (1573) pl. 33, abridging Anon (1431), Y.B. 11 Hen. VI f. 43, pl. 30.
60 Some examples of wager being barred are: a waste action where the facts were visible
to the sheriff visiting the site (H. Bracton, On the Law and Customs of England (1256) fo. 315-
16, trans. S.E. Thorne, ed. G.E. Woodbine (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1975) at 406-7); contracts
apparent to the community, such as labour contracts (Anon (1414), Y.B. 2 Hen. V f. 3, pl. 9);
actions for land arrears against a tenant (Anon (1469), Y.B. 9 Edw. IV f. I, pl. 1); and for receivers
of goods, other than in private (see Milsom, supra; note 21 at 281-82).
61 In Stubbings v. Rotheram (1596), Cro. Eliz. 454, 78 Eng. Rep. 693-94. Anderson J., in
the late sixteenth century, could still say, "The reason why debt lied not against an executor upon
the contract of the testator, is because the law doth not intend that he is privy thereto, or can
have notice thereof...."
62 Anon (1373), Y.B. 47 Edw. III f. 22, pl. 50.
63 Wager was allowed in bailment because of "the confidence originally reposed in the bailee
by the bailor, in the borrower by the lender, and the like; from whence arose a strong presumptive
evidence, that in the plaintiffs own opinion the defendant was worthy of credit." W. Blackstone,
Commentaries on The Laws of England, vol. 3 (Portland, Me.: T.B. Wait, 1807) at 152.
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by the easing of the burden of proof in actions brought by buyers of
ascertainable goods.
Detinue's evidentiary logic of requiring that the plaintiff have a
property interest in the goods in the defendant's possession collapsed
in actions brought by the buyer of undelivered goods. Plaintiffs convinced
the courts that their interest was present through the legal fiction that
a property interest passed from the seller to the buyer/plaintiff by way
of a constructive delivery of the goods at the date of the sale. Thereafter,
the seller held the goods for the plaintiffs benefit.64 In time the passage
of property fiction was extended from bailment cases to informal executory
sales contracts - which did not require production of either a sealed
covenant or evidence of part performance. Were it not for the availability
of wager, the passage of property fiction could be viewed as the birth
of a modern theory of the enforceability of informal executory promises.
Since alternatives available to plaintiffs under contractual writs
seemed to have been exhausted, plaintiffs looked to tort theory for
assistance. Trespass writs attracted plaintiffs because the mode of trial
was trial by jury and thus defendants could not rely upon wager of law.
IV. TORTIOUS MISFEASANCE
By the early 1400s, the royal courts occasionally allowed plaintiffs
to claim the trespassory tort of assumpsit for misfeasance based on
damages suffered as a consequence of a consensual relationship with
the defendant. By the end of the fifteenth century the King's Bench had
extended trespass to cover the nonfeasance of the promisor for failure
to perform.65 An action in trespass was favoured by plaintiffs over covenant
and debt actions because of procedural advantages,66 especially the
preclusion of wager of law.67
In 1400, assumpsit for a misfeasance was a subspecies of the trespass
action for nonforcible wrongs of trespass on the case. The early decisions
permitting a trespass on the case action for performing an obligation
poorly involved defendants engaged in a common calling who not only
committed a private wrong, but were also guilty of the breach of a
64 Milsom, supra, note 5 at 274.
65 The King's Bench was attempting to increase its business in contract-related matters, within
the domain of the Court of Common Pleas through its debt jurisdiction. The King's Bench could
not hear debt writs but could hear trespass writs.
66 Other advantages to the plaintiff in trespass included procedures developed in actions to
keep the King's peace, such as the process and execution procedures of capias, outlawry, and
imprisonment.
67 Simpson, supra, note 6 at 219-20. It was proposed that trial by jury be imposed in covenant
in 1284 in Statute of Wales 12 Edw. I, c. 10.
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customary duty considered to be an offence against the public authority.68
These common callings included ferrymen,69 veterinarians,70 farriers,71
surgeons, 72 merchants, 73 innkeepers, and common carriers.74
In light of defendants' arguments that these consensual relationships
sounded in covenant and should be dismissed because of a lack of
documentation, the common law courts began to allow these actions
on the evidence of the local residents' knowledge of customary trans-
actions. The proof of the transaction was the locals' knowledge of both
the poorly performed transaction and the plaintiffs resultant consequential
damages. A few examples of consensual relationships between plaintiffs
and defendants engaged in common callings are: the drowning of the
plaintiffs mare as a result of falling from the defendant's ferry,75 the
death of the plaintiffs horse at the hands of the veterinarian, 76 the death
of the plaintiffs horse after the farrier's shoeing,77 the plaintiffs injury
caused by the surgeon's malpractice, 78 the plaintiffs possession of defective
goods purchased from the merchant,79 the theft of the plaintiffs goods
while a guest in the defendant's inn,80 the damage to the plaintiffs goods
while being hauled by the defendant common carrier,81 and so on.
V. TORTIOUS NONFEASANCE
As the fifteenth century progressed, the use of a trespass action
for the misfeasance of performing poorly was extended to cover the
nonfeasance of failing to perform the promised act. The courts took
most of the fifteenth century to arrive at the logical conclusion that if
68 Milsom, supra note 21 at 316-20.
69 Humber Feny Case (1348), Lib. Ass. pl. 41.
70 Waldon v. Marshall (1370), Y.B. 43 Edw. III f. 33. A marshall was a veterinary surgeon.
71 The Farrier's Case (1373), Y.B. 46 Edw. III f. 19.
72 Calendar of Plea and Memorandum Rolls, 236 (1364-81) at 236.
73 Anon (1368), Y.B. 41 Edw. III f. 10 involved a warranty of title; Anon (1373), Fitz. Ley.
7 Ric. II 41, and Garrok v. Heytesberg (1387), Y.B. I 1 Ric. II (Ames Found.) 4, both involved
the breach of a warranty of quality (horses warranted to be sound).
74 Simpson, supra, note 6 at 229-33.
75 Humber Feny Case, supra, note 69.
76 Waldon v. Marshall, supra, note 70.
77 The Farrier's Case, supra, note 7 1.
78 Calendar of Plea and Memorandum Rolls, supra, note 72.
79 Anon (1368), supra, note 73.
80 Anon, 42 Lib. Ass. pl. 17, f. 260.
81 Plucknett, supra, note 3 at 482. See also Kiralfy, supra, note 32 at 154-57.
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assumpsit was available for performing poorly it should also be available
for the wrong of not performing at all. 82
Nevertheless, the unassailable logic of allowing assumpsit to encom-
pass both types of wrongs did not of itself assuage the royal courts'
distrust of trial by jury. Due to the lack of judicial control over the
jury, the royal courts would not allow a case to go the jury on the mere
allegation of the nonfeasance of an informal promise. The courts wanted
concrete evidence of the promise, of which there was none.
Notwithstanding the royal courts' evidentiary concerns, pressure
mounted on the courts to formulate a remedy for the increasing number
of unanswered pleas of nonfeasance appearing on the plea rolls. The
increase in nonfeasance cases was due to two major economic changes.
First, a market economy was emerging following the demise of the feudal
system and a new class was developing based on money rather than
land. With the onset of Tudor stability, England's economy was improv-
ing. Just as the volume of agreements formed by this new class was
increasing, so was the number of contract cases appearing in the common
law courts.
Second, during the inflationary fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the
fall in the value of money forced most cases to be brought to the royal
courts as the local courts had been statutorily barred from hearing disputes
in excess of forty shillings since 1278.83 With the decline in the value
of money, commoners and small business owners found that disputes
over their customarily informal transactions could no longer be litigated
in the local courts where informal promises had traditionally been
enforceable.
In the local courts at the community level, trying these informal
covenant actions by wager of law was effective.84 A commoner was
not in the custom of formally documenting promises and did not have
access to the legal counsel necessary for the execution of a covenant
or a conditioned bond. In addition, the literacy rate, though improving,
is estimated at about 15 percent of the laity in the countryside and perhaps
82 See Baker, supra, note 9 at 266, 275. The use of tort law to provide a remedy for the
passive failure to act is an invasion of the province of contract law. An active wrong causing
injury naturally is covered by trespass, but liability for failing to perform an obligation created
by agreement is another matter.
83 J.S. Beckerman, "The Forty-Shilling Jurisdictional Limit in Medieval English Personal
Actions" in D. Jenkins, ed., Legal History Studie 1972 (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1975)
at 110. Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 8.
84 It should be noted, however, that not all local courts were effective in enforcing informal
promises. Consequently, there are instances of fifteenth century plaintiffs trumping up a forty shilling
claim in order to obtain royal court jurisdiction. See Milsom, supra, note 5 at 258-59.
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in excess of 30 percent in the cities. 85 Acknowledging these factors, the
royal courts began to reevaluate their refusal to grant relief for
nonfeasance.
The first Year Book report of a case of assumpsit for nonfeasance
was in 1400.86 The plaintiff alleged that a carpenter had promised to
build a house but had failed to perform. The defendant demurred because
there was no sealed covenant, and the court agreed. One judge stated,
"Because you have counted on a covenant and shown nothing for it,
you shall take nothing for it.... ." The common law courts were
understandably reluctant to allow a jury to consider an allegation of
an informal executory promise for which there was no third party evidence
due to the private nature of the transaction. The result might have been
different had the carpenter been governed by the Ordinance and Statute
of Labourers.87 The Statute of Labourers was passed as a dying gasp
of the feudal system in order to ensure compulsory agricultural services.
Feudal status had the nature of a property right enforceable in the courts.
This idea of status was extended to duties recognized by custom in the
towns independent of tenurial relationships - for example, the surgeon
or the seller of goods. When disputes arose in the courts regarding the
failure of these workers and artisans to perform, witnesses in the
community or countryside would testify as to the employment. Liability
for this special type of nonfeasance would arise pursuant to the Statute
of Labourers.
The actions in the nature of trespass and covenant 88 brought under
the Statute of Labourers add some confusion to the study of the
development of trespass liability for nonfeasance because the basis for
these actions was statutory law rather than contract theory.8 9 The common
law courts were comfortable with providing relief in cases involving a
status well known to the countryside; however, one must be wary of
85 A study of wills and grammar schools in the diocese of York estimates a literacy rate
in 1500 of 15 percent overall in the Diocese and nearly 30 percent in the City of York. J.H.
Moran, "Literacy and Education in Northern England (1350-1500)" (1981) 17 Northern History
1 at 17, 23. A study of London laymen in 1470 suggests a literacy rate of about 50 percent.
S. Thrupp, The Merchant Class of Medieval London 1300-1500 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1948) at 156-58. Also see generally for an earlier period, M.T. Clanchy, From Memory
to Written Record4 England 1066-1307 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).
86 Watton v. Brinth (1400), Y.B. 2 Hen. IV f. 3.
87 23 Edw. III and 25 Edw. III. A carpenter was not covered because the statute was intended
for permanent contracts for services with an employer and not the activities of an independent
contractor.
88 There was a controversy during this period as to whether actions under the statute were
in trespass or covenant. One judge expressly took the position that it was covenant. Anon (1409),
Y.B. 11 Hen. IV f. 33, pl. 60.
89 Thelnetham v. Penne (1378) 88 Selden Soc. 7.
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directly analogizing these cases to private agreements not based on status
or custom.
Re-addressing the independent contractor cases not governed by
status or custom, plaintiffs bringing an assumpsit for nonfeasance began
to succeed at trial during the second quarter of the fifteenth century.
In the first cases granting relief, dated 1424 and 1436, the plaintiff's
property was entrusted to the defendant for repair. In these cases the
defendants began the work and then abandoned the project.90 In the
1424 case the Chief Justice pointed to the resultant damages of an
abandonment that could be suffered by a plaintiff, such as the damage
to a house if the roof repair was not completed and the client's damage
if his lawyer failed to plead. The entrustment, abandonment, and dam-
ages were evidence observable to the fact-finder of the existence of the
agreement. In the 1436 case one justice said, "And the cause in all these
cases (of misfeasance) is that there is an undertaking and a matter in
fact beyond that which sounds in covenant." 9' The "matter in fact," being
the abandonment and damages, was sufficient evidence for the court.
A sealed document for what otherwise was a covenant action was not
required. Martin J. registered his concern in his dissent to the 1424 case,
"Everyone would then have an action of trespass on every broken covenant
in the world." 92 Martin J. may have been worried about forsaking the
formalities of contract law in light of the serious deficiencies of trial
by jury.93
These isolated cases of entrustment and abandonment were in the
nature of a misfeasance since physical damage was still an ingredient
of the action. Near the middle of the fifteenth century royal courts no
longer demanded evidence of the entrustment and physical damage to
the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff's prepayment of money to the non-
performing defendant became a new means of proof of partial execution
of an informal agreement. This approach was followed in the well-known
Doige's Case,94 decided in 1440. While closer to a pure nonfeasance
fact situation, the case still had elements of a misfeasance. The defendant
had promised to sell her land to the plaintiff but conveyed it to a third
person. The defendant committed more than nonfeasance since she was
90 Watkin's Case (1424), Y.B. 3 Hen. VI pl. 33, f. 36 and Anon (1436), Y.B. 14 Hen. VI
f. 18, pl. 58.
91 Anon, ibid.
92 Watkins Case, supra, note 90.
93 Simpson, supra, note 6 at 223.
94 (1442), Y.B. 20 Hen VI f. 34, pl. 4, 51 Selden Soc. 97.
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found liable for the active, deceitful 95 wrong of disabling herself from
selling to the plaintiff. However, this was a step forward because assumpsit
was allowed for a broken promise in which there were no resultant physical
damages.
If there were no physical damages in Doige, where was the proof
of the transaction which the courts had demanded in past assumpsit
actions? The answer was the evidence of the plaintiffs execution of his
part of the bargain by prepayment of 110 pounds to the defendant. Paston
J. supported the plaintiffs position because, "The bargain proves the
agreement, namely when the money was paid." 96 But Ayscoghe J.
dissented, ".... for it was his folly that he should have taken an estate
which could be defeated, where he might have waived that estate and
relied on his writ of covenant. . .. "97
Thereafter, if there was a disablement and prepayment, plaintiffs
could prevail. Doige is usually cited for its disablement theory, but it
is submitted that the emphasis on disablement was due to a jurisdictional
squabble. Newton cJ. emphasized disablement because otherwise the
plaintiff had a remedy in Chancery.98 Chancery would not grant specific
performance in a disablement fact situation because the defendant no
longer had the property.99 The common law courts were competing with
Chancery for business and were vigilant in their search for opportunities
to expand their jurisdiction if there was no direct overlap with Chancery.
Disablement, without the evidence of prepayment, would not have been
remediable since the defendant's sale of the property to a third party
was not proof of an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant.
Disablement coupled with prepayment became actionable as a rule
of thumb. 00 By the end of the fifteenth century, common sense again
demanded the actionability of a broken promise where there was
prepayment regardless of disablement.' 0' The first reported recognition
of liability for prepayment alone was in a 1499 statement of the Chief
95 Prior to Doige's Case there had been trespass actions allowed for the deceit of a sellers
of goods in breaching their warranties. Langham v. Spencer (1414) 88 Selden Soc. 222.
96 Doige's Case supra, note 94 at 98.
97 Ibid. at 100.
98 Ibid. at 99.
99 See Milsom, supra, note 21 at 328-29 and Baker, supra, note 9 at 278-9. The common
law courts were competing both with Chancery and each other for business. The Court of Common
Pleas could hear writs of covenant on a sealed document. The King's Bench tried to drum up
business for itself in informal covenant cases that the Court of Common Pleas did not accept
due to their lack of documentation by hearing them under a bill of trespass. See Milsom, ibid.
at 316-17.
100 Milsom, ibid. at 331-32.
101 Ibid.
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Justice of the King's Bench, Fyneux, in another failure-to-convey case
brought in assumpsit.02 Fyneux CJ. stated that the plaintiff who had made
payment to the seller had an assumpsit action. The absence of disablement
had no effect on the evidence of the agreement susceptible of knowledge
by the "men of the country."
Were it not for the jurisdictional overlap with Chancery, the royal
courts might have sooner followed the suggestion of a clerk named Brown
who had argued in 1441 for the actionability of a case involving
prepayment without disablement. Brown declared, "If a man prepays
any sum of money that a house be built for him ... and he does not
do it, now he will have an action of trespass on his case because the
defendant has quid pro quo and so the plaintiff is damaged."' 0 3 Brown's
reasoning did not persuade the court, but his logic was adopted by the
end of the century, notwithstanding the overlap with Chancery.
This common sense approach adopted by the King's Bench in 1499
was followed by the Court of Common Pleas in a 1505 non-disablement
case. 10 4 Thus the common law courts were united in their support of
Brown's 1441 argument. 0 5 An essential element of proof required was
prepayment, as posed in a hypothetical in the Common Pleas case.
Frowyke C.J. remarked, "If I covenant with a carpenter to build a house
and pay him 20 pounds to build the house by a certain day, and he
does not build the house by the day, now I shall have a good action
on my case because of the payment of my money; and yet it sounds
only in covenant, and without the payment of money in this there is
no remedy." The judge concluded that if the defendant had the plaintiff's
money in an arms-length transaction, then surely there had been an
agreement and a loss upon breach of that agreement. 06 In the next century
the requirement of the payment of money would be formalized into the
requirement of consideration.
The 1499 King's Bench case and its companion 1505 Court of
Common Pleas case were landmarks in the development of a remedy
replacing the unworkable writ of covenant for the defendant's
nonfeasance. This new theory did not foment an evidentiary crisis because
102 Anon (1506), Y.B. 21 Hen. VII f. 41, pl. 66.
103 Anon (1441), Y.B. 19 Hen VI, Harvard Ms. 156 (unfoliated); Simpson, supra, note 6 at
626. The report adds that Brown's view was privately denied.
104 Orvell v. Mortoft (1505), Y.B. 20 Hen. VII f. 8, pl. 18. See also A.K. Kiralfy, A Source
Book of English Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1957) at 150.
105 The late fifteenth century shift of the courts was well recognized. In the mid-sixteenth
century, Brooke in his Abridgement explained that the fifteenth century cases that had denied liability
for nonfeasance had done so because there was no payment by the plaintiff. Brooke, supra, note
59 at pl. 7 and pl. 40.
106 Simpson, supra, note 6 at 239-40.
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of the requirement of prepayment. The final step toward a unified modern
theory of contract was the extension of this new remedy for partially
executed agreements to agreements which were wholly executory. This
extension would be adopted during the succeeding century 07 but not
without problems as the courts were unable to design a remedy for the
breach of a parol executory promise without procedural evidentiary
difficulties. 108
VI. CONCLUSION
Fifteenth century records reflect the transition from the refusal of
the royal courts to grant relief in cases lacking the documentary
requirements of the ancient remedies to permitting trial by jury for the
breach of an informal promise. During this process, the courts maintained
control of the embryonic Medieval jury by not allowing a case before
the jury without prima facie evidence that a promise had been made
and breached.
The courts preferred the documentary evidence afforded by either
a sealed covenant or a conditioned bond. If that was not present, court
records documenting a recognizance or an account were satisfactory.
The actions of debt sur contract and detinue for the breach of informal
promises were actionable on evidence of part performance although
defendants could still wage their law.
As plaintiffs turned to assumpsit to prevent a defendant from using
wager of law, the courts resisted these actions on informal promises
unless demands for solid evidence of the transaction could be fulfilled.
In assumpsit for misfeasance plaintiffs convinced the courts that the
entrustment of the property to the defendant and subsequent damage
was adequate evidence to permit the case to the jury. In the late fifteenth
century the courts' ultimate allowance of assumpsit for nonfeasance was
conditioned upon evidence of the plaintiffs prepayment. Assumpsit actions
were thus recognized by the courts for the enforcement of informal
promises, as long as either entrustment or prepayment was proven.
The theme linking the contract decisions of the fifteenth century
analyzed in this article was not always clearly articulated in the plea
rolls or the Year Book reports of those cases. The common law courts
had jurisdictional squabbles, precedent, and the pressures of a changing
107 Slade v. Morley (1602), 4 Coke Rep. 91 a, 92b. In effect Slade's case permitted the action
of assumpsit to supplant debt sur contrat.
108 For a more detailed account of the evidentiary crisis that Slade's case created, see K.M.
Teeven, "Seventeenth Century Evidentiary Concerns and the Statute of Frauds" (1983) 9 Adelaide
L. Rev. 252.
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economy to contend with in addition to the proof problems presented
by plaintiffs bringing actions for breaches of parol promises. There can,
however, be found a consistent judicial concern that evidentiary safe-
guards be built into the new use of assumpsit. The requirement of these
safeguards as an element in the enforceability of informal promises left
an imprint on contract law well after the fifteenth century.

